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Entitled to be a Radical? 
Counter-Terrorism and Travesty of Human Rights in the Case of Babar Ahmad. 
 
 
Introduction 
This case study presents the experiences between 2003 and 2014 of a British Muslim man, 
Babar Ahmad, with the counter-terrorism forces of the United Kingdom and the United 
States, and with their justice systems, along with the acquiescence of the European Court of 
Human Rights. The account offered here demonstrates the reliance of the states concerned on 
unlawful violence in these processes. The unlawfulness includes, notably, breaches of 
international law dealing with human rights, but also involves illegalities perpetrated by the 
state in both the UK and the USA. That this state crime is routine and systemic is 
demonstrated by the impunity of the perpetrators. It is arguably ‘empire crime’, in that it is 
committed by agents of several states in concert, in the context of an unequal hegemonic 
alliance between the states involved. It involves the transnational criminalisation of 
expressing and propagating ‘radical’ religious and political views, even though these 
expressions may be quite lawful – and indeed formally guaranteed as human rights – in the 
place and at the time that they are expressed. The state response is deliberately terrifying and 
demonstrably disproportionate to any danger, and functions to ‘send a message’ to ‘othered’ 
communities designated as dangerous. In the process, members of these communities, such as 
Babar Ahmad, who are singled out as examples in shows of counter-terrorist force, are bereft 
of recognition of their humanity and their human rights. This case involves what Ahmad’s 
supporters claimed was the longest incarceration without trial in modern-day Britain1; it is an 
extreme case in that respect, but it is exemplary in demonstrating the targeted abrogation of 
human rights in the ‘war on terror’. 
   
 
 
 
Pre-Dawn Raid 
Before dawn on the morning of 2nd December 2003, 29-year-old British IT engineer Babar 
Ahmad and his wife were asleep in bed in their home in Tooting, London. They woke 
suddenly to loud banging as their front door was smashed in. Rushing to the window in his 
pyjamas, Mr Ahmad saw a line of police in riot helmets and dark clothing. They entered his 
house. He heard them on the stairs and saw them burst into his bedroom, shouting, ‘Police, 
police!’ He had his hands up, facing them passively. The officers shouted, ‘Get down, 
fucking get down!’, but before he could do so they grabbed his arms, twisted them behind his 
back and pushed him head first into the window. Mr Ahmad did not resist, at this or any other 
stage. At least two of the policemen punched him all over, and kneed him in the thighs. 
Though compliant, he was forced face-down onto the floor, and then beaten severely and at 
length by some five or six of them, all over his body, on his head, the side of his face, his ear, 
and his back and thigh. All this time his hands were held fast behind his back by a police 
officer. One officer grabbed him by the testicles and tugged them hard, causing severe pain 
(Ahmad v Commissioner of Police, 2007). 
 
The officer apparently in charge asked Babar Ahmad his name, and told him he was ‘under 
arrest on suspicion of having committed, instigated or prepared terrorist offences’ (Ahmad v 
Commissioner of Police, 2007). The assailants turned out to be counter-terrorism officers of 1 
Unit 1 Area Territorial Support Group based at the high-security Paddington Green police 
station. 
 
   
 
The officers continued to beat Mr Ahmed in front of their senior officer. They handcuffed 
him behind his back with plastic ties, by which they painfully hauled him to his feet, causing 
him to scream in agony, and which they twisted to inflict further intense pain. One of the 
officers stamped repeatedly on his feet. He was propelled downstairs, where he was forced to 
his knees and bent into the Muslim prayer position, and taunted, ‘Where is your God now? ... 
Pray to Him’. Babar Ahmad’s wife, Maryam, witnessed all of these proceedings, which 
naturally traumatised her as well; she was also handcuffed and mocked by the police (Yusuf, 
2006). 
 
Mr Ahmad was made to lie on the floor while his pyjama pants were taken down, and his 
genitals were handled amid laughter from the police. His pants pulled up again, he was once 
more dragged painfully to his feet by the cuffs, again had his feet stamped on, and was hit 
further on the head and back. He was bundled into a police van where he was once again 
deliberately tortured by manipulating the handcuffs and forcing him against the metal leg of 
the seat. He was told, ‘You fucking cunt, you’ll remember this day for the rest of your life, do 
you understand me, you fucking bastard?’ He was twice placed in a life-threatening neck 
hold that compromised his breathing and made him to feel that he was about to die. 
 
By the time he was pulled from the van at Charing Cross Police station in a collapsed state, as 
recorded on CCTV, some 73 separate injuries had been inflicted on Babar Ahmad, according 
to doctors who examined him over the following week (Verkaik, 2013). There was bleeding 
in his ears and blood in his urine. The custody sergeant later testified that his handcuff 
injuries were the worst he had seen in his 30 years as a police officer. 
 
   
 
The point here is not merely to recount this unlawful police violence, but to argue that this 
violence is not gratuitous, nor the work of errant individuals, but is systemic, purposeful, and 
serves the function of intimidating – indeed terrorising – communities from which the victims 
come, and imposing an awful and often prohibitive ‘price tag’ on political organisation and 
civil resistance by these communities. In a globalised empire, this function is global. The 
state criminality in question is also manifestly targeted through a process of racialisation of 
Muslims, as is borne out by some of the details of the particular violence here described, as 
well as by the statistics of raids, stop-and-searches, and other state action involving racialised 
profiling. It is state violence involving institutional racism. This applies not only to the 
violence of police beatings and other torture, but also to the violence of disproportionate, 
unjust, inhumane, indeterminate and solitary incarceration. 
 
‘Grave abuse tantamount to torture’ 
Now none of the facts of the above account were disputed six year later, in the civil trial 
for battery against the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, before Mr Justice Holroyde 
at the High Court in London. Babar Ahmad was there awarded £60,000 compensation from 
the London Metropolitan Police (Babar Ahmad v the Commissioner of Police, 2009), for 
what their commissioner, Sir Paul Stephenson, then admitted was ‘gratuitous and sustained 
violence’ during this arrest: ‘Grave abuse tantamount to torture’ (Taylor and Williams, 2009). 
The compensation included ‘aggravated and exemplary damages to reflect 
the shocking conduct of the Metropolitan Police as an institution as well 
as of the individual officers’ (Bhatt Murphy Solicitors, 2009). 
 
Now that is a clear admission of state crime, and a rare one which does not attempt the ‘bad 
apples’ defence. It clearly involves breaches against the UN Convention on Torture. This 
   
 
convention requires that alleged cases of torture be prosecuted by the competent authorities 
(Article 7) and proceed to ‘a prompt and impartial investigation’ (Article 12). This eventually 
happened, if not promptly, in as much as four of the Metropolitan Police officers who 
engaged in the ‘grave abuse tantamount to torture’ were ultimately prosecuted for assault. 
The outcome was a travesty, in complete contradiction with the civil trial, as we shall see 
below. 
 
A more minor, but significant breach, of the law by the British state was committed while 
Babar Ahmad was preparing for his civil case against the Met. It is unlawful in Britain, under 
what is called the ‘Wilson doctrine’, to subject members of parliament to covert surveillance 
recordings. Ignoring this, British police did just that in 2005 and 2006 in bugging Sadiq Khan 
MP while visiting his constituent Babar Ahmad in prison. The bugging was approved by 
Assistant Commissioner Andy Hayman. An official inquiry into the unlawful bugging, by 
chief surveillance commissioner Sir Christopher Rose, whitewashed the breach by declaring 
that the police officers weren’t to know. It beggars belief, as Khan wrote to the inquiry, that 
Hayman, head of counter-terrorism at Scotland Yard, did not know he was an MP (Dodd, 
2008). A greater whitewash was to come. 
 
Implicatory denial? 
How can it happen that members of the jury in the eventual criminal trial of the Met officers 
in 2011 could not only acquit those police conceded by the commissioner to have committed 
torture, but even request to shake the hands of the brave torturers? This has partly to do with 
the fact that key evidence in the keeping of the Metropolitan Police simply went missing: 
including all the officers’ contemporaneous notebooks, along with a tape-recorded interview 
with the senior officer in the case, and a large number of mail sacks full of documents 
   
 
containing complaints about similar violence by the very same officers. The jury at this 
criminal trial was not allowed to know about the admissions and outcome of the previous 
civil trial, nor could they be informed that there were over 70 complaints against the officers 
concerned, including 30 against one defendant, PC Mark Jones, who was suspended from the 
police at the time of his trial (Ansari, 2011). Later, in October 2015 – too late for Babar 
Ahmad – the High Court in London found that the same former PC Jones had, together with a 
colleague, assaulted and racially humiliated two young men of Arab background in 2007, 
with Mr Justice Gilbert finding that Jones had hit one of them and grabbed him around the 
neck, making it difficult for him to breathe (BBC News, 2015). 
 
Yet the failure to achieve justice for Babar Ahmad as a victim of torture – his dozens of 
documented injuries at the hand of the police were never contested – has also partly to do 
with a form of denial that Stan Cohen identified as ‘implicatory denial’ (2001: 101ff): they 
got what they deserved – even though it didn’t happen. That is, Babar Ahmad had effectively 
been constructed as someone not entitled to human rights. During the trial of PC Jones and 
the three others, Jones went on record as saying that he believed Babar Ahmad was a 
terrorist. 
 
Now let’s keep one thing clearly in mind: the Convention on Torture makes plain in Article 2 
that no circumstances – not even war nor terrorism – can make torture lawful (Article 2.2). 
The guilt or innocence of the tortured party is irrelevant. Mr Ahmad was entitled to human 
rights as a human being, even if he were a terrorist. 
 
Having made that point, we can now consider that Babar Ahmad, who was in British territory 
for all the period in question, in fact had never committed a crime under British law. After his 
   
 
arrest by the counter-terrorism police, and interrogation for a week, the Crown Prosecution 
Service found that there was not the evidence even to charge him with any criminal offence 
(Verkaik, 2016). He has never been tried for, let alone convicted of, any offence under British 
law. 
 
Special Relationship: The US-UK Extradition Treaty 
The arrest occasioning the raid on Babar Ahmad’s house in December 2003 had been 
conducted at the behest of the United States in its reaction against militant Muslims in the 
aftermath of September 11. While a student at Imperial College London, Ahmad had 
volunteered, lawfully under British law, to support military struggles by Muslim populations 
in Bosnia in 1992 and 1995 and in Chechnya in 1996 – though hostilities in the latter were 
over by the time he arrived, and he helped out in orphanages instead. To honour the fallen in 
both wars, he helped set up a website, Azzam.com, publishing stories of these conflicts. After 
9/11, this website published two pieces in support of the then governing Taliban in 
Afghanistan (Verkaik, 2016). This was quite legal in Britain, but drew the ire of US security 
services, who had the website taken down in mid-2002. It was as a result of this website 
expression of political-religious support, and US agents’ requests to counter-terrorism 
officers of their ‘special relationship’ ally the UK, that Babar Ahmad was so violently and 
unlawfully arrested by the Met in London in 2003. 
 
I have elsewhere analysed other cases of state crime in the name of counter-terrorism as 
empire crime: that is, breaches of international or national law carried out in concert by 
agents of several nation-states in an alliance in which political and moral leadership and 
direction comes from hegemonic state or suprastate actors (Poynting, 2015). Two such cases 
are those of both Australian Guantánamo detainees, David Hicks and Mamdouh Habib 
   
 
(Poynting, 2010), neither of whom ever – it is a matter of record – committed an offence 
against Australian law, and both of whom were knowingly allowed by the Australian state to 
be unlawfully held and tortured by the US military, who were abetted by Australia officials in 
their interrogation and mistreatment. In each of these cases, implicatory denial was engaged 
in by the Australian state, and state-fed media propaganda promoted the notion that they 
deserved what they got. This is also what was to befall Babar Ahmad, with a supine British 
and indeed European judicial system handing the Briton over for trial in Connecticut in the 
US, because of the false claim by a US agent that one of Azzam.com’s ISPs was allegedly 
hosted in that state (Verkaik, 2016). 
 
Eight months after the violent raid on his home, Babar Ahmed was once more arrested by 
British police, this time pursuant to an extradition application from the US, under the 
Extradition Act 2003. All of the evidence cited by US officers in the extradition document 
had been seized by British police during the six days that he was held in detention in 
December 2003 – from his house and his office and his parents’ home, and notably from 
computers – and given over to US counter-terrorism officers (Home Office Extradition 
Review 2010/11; see also Human Rights Joint Committee, 2011b). Only weeks before 
Ahmad’s rearrest, the British Crown Prosecution Service had definitively ruled that there was 
no evidence from all of the investigations over some eight months that would sustain a 
prosecution under British law. The gist of the US allegations was that through his support of 
the website azzam.com, with its commentary principally on Chechen insurgency, Babar 
Ahmad had given material support to terrorism. It is not disputed that he was in the UK all 
the time that these sites were maintained, from 1996 until their closure in 2002. The US 
claimed jurisdiction in the case because, for a period of a year and a half over 2000-2001, just 
one of the several dozen servers that hosted these websites around the world was located in 
   
 
the US. The UK was clearly handing over all the evidence in this case, and effectively 
handing over jurisdiction, on a very spurious technicality, to the US. 
 
The US-UK Extradition Treaty was incorporated into British law as the Extradition Act 2003, 
though the treaty was not ratified by the US Senate until 2006 and thus did not come into 
effect until April 2007. That was not the only lopsided aspect of the arrangement, as we shall 
see. In 2003, during debate in the House of Lords, Minister of State in the Home Office, 
Baroness Scotland, noted that ‘complete reciprocity has never been a feature of our 
extradition arrangements’ (Home Affairs Committee, 2012: 6). 
 
The US-UK Extradition Treaty was agreed in the context of the ‘war on terror’ between the 
George W. Bush administration and the Blair government. The House of Commons Home 
Affairs Committee (2012: 5) makes clear the rationale for the new legislation: ‘The 
development of the internet and the rise of international terrorism and organised crime mean 
that extradition is now more important than ever...’. 
 
Admiral James Loy, Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security in the US was even blunter 
about purposes for which the US-UK Extradition Treaty was intended. Speaking when 
Ahmad was arrested, he said that the two allies had woken up to the threat of cyber-terrorism, 
and that the Treaty was a crucial weapon against this. ‘This is a new realm, this is a new era 
that demands international co-operation associated with crimes that have international 
implications: The Ahmad case is that case’ (Casciani, 2012)2. 
 
The Extradition Act 2003 was passed in November of that year, the very month before Babar 
Ahmad was first arrested. It made possible for the first time extradition for computer-related 
offences. It was retrospective, which meant that Ahmad and others could be extradited for 
   
 
alleged offences prior to 2003. Most controversially, it replaced the previous basis for 
extradition, which had provided that offences charged must be unlawful in the UK. 
Moreover, in the case of extradition to the US, it did away with the need to establish a prima 
facie case: the test became the less demanding ‘reasonable suspicion’. In the case of 
extradition from the US to the UK, however, the Treaty set the test as ‘probable cause’. This 
has been widely argued to be more stringent, and possibly more importantly, the probable 
cause can be contested in a US court before extradition, whereas there is no comparable legal 
challenge allowed in the UK to ‘reasonable suspicion’. Babar Ahmad’s legal representatives 
were simply not permitted to contest the reasonableness of the allegations against him. Given, 
for instance, that US officials asserted that a DVD recording confiscated from Ahmad’s 
parents’ home, of a documentary about the heroism of New York fire brigades following the 
9/11 attacks was a ‘pro-9/11 DVD’ (Verkaik, 2016), a challenge to the reasonableness of the 
allegations  could well have been warranted. 
 
The lopsidedness of the treaty arrangements in practice is demonstrated by the statistics. 
According to the Home Office, some 33 British citizens were extradited to the US from the 
beginning of 2004 to the end of 2011; whereas only 7 US citizens had been extradited from 
the US to the UK (Home Office Civil Liberties and Public Protection Directorate, 2012). The 
number of US citizens extradited to the UK for an alleged crime committed while in the US – 
the counterpart of Babar Ahmad’s situation – was zero (Rojas, 2012). In recognition of such 
imbalance, in June 2011 the UK Parliament Human Rights Joint Committee recommended 
that the US-UK Extradition Treaty be renegotiated to set ‘probable cause’ as the test for 
extradition from the UK to the US, in line with US-UK extradition, and also ‘to exclude the 
possibility that extradition is requested and granted in cases such as that of ... Mr Ahmed 
[sic], where the UK police and prosecution authorities have already made a decision not to 
   
 
charge or prosecute an individual on the same evidence adduced by the US authorities to 
request extradition’ (Human Rights Joint Committee, 2011a). To date, this renegotiation has 
not happened. 
 
‘Legal limbo’ 
Babar Ahmad was refused bail, and was imprisoned pending extradition to the US. He spent 
eight years detained without charge in maximum security British gaols: said to be the longest 
time on record for any detention without trial in the UK – certainly in modern times. Half of 
that time he spent in Long Lartin’s segregation unit, a ‘prison within a prison’ specially 
designed for terrorism suspects awaiting deportation or extradition, which was criticised by 
the chief inspector of prisons for conditions more restrictive even than those of convicted 
terrorists. Chief Inspector of Prisons Nick Hardwick described it as ‘a severely restricted 
environment for a potentially indefinite period’ imposed on ‘a small number of detainees, 
who already inhabit a kind of legal limbo.’ ‘The risks to the mental and physical health of 
detainees of such lengthy, ill-defined and isolated confinement are significant,’ he said, 
finding that ‘too little attention was paid to their uniquely isolated and uncertain position’ 
(Casciani, 2011). All seven detainees in the unit were Muslim men labelled as extremists. It is 
reasonable to suppose that this labelling is a key causal factor in their inhumane treatment. 
 
Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR ) provides that 
anyone charged with a criminal offence has the right to be tried ‘without undue delay’. Eight 
years of detention without trial amounts unquestionably to undue delay. Of course, it may be 
argued that Babar Ahmad had indeed not been charged with an offence, since both the 
Crown Prosecution Service (twice) and Attorney General Lord Goldsmith had determined 
that there were no charges for any criminal offence that could be sustained under British law. 
   
 
Yet Article 9 of the ICCPR requires that ‘Anyone who is arrested ... shall be promptly 
informed of any charges against him’. Again, the delay of historic duration in Babar Ahmad’s 
case can in no way be said to be ‘prompt’. Do radical Muslims indeed have civil and political 
rights, or are they somehow exempt? 
 
Now it could be cynically contended, as it was by politicians and media commentators in the 
case of Abu Qatada, that the detainee had only himself to blame for his long incarceration 
without trial, since without his legal challenges to extradition he could have long since been 
tried. Yet this was not generally asserted in Babar Ahmad’s case, and there was indeed much 
judicial and political consternation at his predicament. In June 2011, Judge Geoffrey Rivlin, 
Recorder of Westminster and Deputy High Court Judge, expressed the ‘hope that his ordeal 
as  a man in detention in this country for a number of years without trial is brought to an end 
as soon as possible ... it is a matter of concern ... that here is a man who has been in custody 
for literally years without knowing what his fate is to be’ (Taylor, 2011). In the House of 
Commons in November 2011, Conservative MP Dominic Raab, in a debate on extradition, 
addressed the case of Babar Ahmad by underlining ‘that basic principle of British justice that 
a person is innocent until proven guilty’ and remarking that ‘We are losing sight of that in 
this country’. Ahmad’s ‘period of pre-trial detention is unacceptably high,’ he observed, and 
he commented that it ‘should be looked at carefully within the scope of the UK-US treaty in 
relation to both the “most appropriate forum” safeguard and the other safeguards that might 
be available’(House of Commons Hansard, 24 Nov 2011). In the same debate, Labour MP 
Jeremy Corbyn linked ‘the very strange arrangement that we have with the United States’ 
with ‘perceptions, particularly in the Muslim community across the whole country, ... that 
Babar Ahmad has been so badly treated because of his faith and religion, suffering terrible 
abuse as a result’. He reported that he had received many ‘contacts and e-mails from people 
   
 
who attend local mosques, as well as from people who attend churches and other 
organisations, and who are deeply concerned that somebody should languish for eight years 
in prison on a case that cannot be brought to court in this country.’ 
 
Cruel, inhuman, degrading treatment and punishment 
Now why would Babar Ahmad have been so desperate to avoid extradition to the US as to 
suffer eight years of detention without trial in maximum security prisons of his own country? 
Of course, he had every right to expect that he would not be detained indefinitely in the UK 
in breach of international law. Indeed, a popular campaign was built, for him to be tried in 
Britain: a petition of nearly 150,000 signatures was presented to parliament (UK Government 
and Parliament Petitions, 2010) and over a hundred senior lawyers publicly supported the 
demand.  Halfway through his eventual eight years in UK prisons, Babar Ahmad was 
interviewed by the NGO Cageprisoners, now called CAGE. He recounted how a former 
Belmarsh detainee, Syed Fahad Hashmi, who was extradited to the US, was in prison there 
awaiting trial ‘in complete solitary confinement, locked in a bare concrete cell without access 
to natural light’ (Cageprisoners, 2008). In fact Hashmi was then to spend another two of his 
three years under these conditions, locked down for 23 hours a day. Eventually he was to be 
sentenced to 15 years for material support for terrorism – the same accusation faced by 
Ahmad – in his case sending socks and ponchos, called ‘military equipment’, to insurgents in 
Afghanistan. Said Ahmad, This is the same story in every case and this is the prospect that 
awaits me and the others who are also in Long Lartin fighting extradition to the USA’ 
(Cageprisoners, 2008). Babar Ahmad later explained that he was resisting ‘spend[ing] the rest 
of my life in a “supermax” US prison in total solitary confinement’ (CAGE, 2016). Hashmi 
was looking at the time at a likely prison term of 75 years – indeed the rest of his life; he was 
sentenced to 15 years after a plea bargain. 
   
 
 
Ahmad’s father wrote, in a letter read to the House of Commons on 5 December 2011: ‘If 
extradited to the US Babar faces a period of 3 years pre-trial detention in complete isolation. 
If convicted he would face life without parole in solitary confinement at a Supermax prison’ 
(House of Commons Hansard Debates, 5 Dec 2011, column 107). 
 
In 2012, during Ahmad’s last recourse of appeal, The European Court of Human Rights 
accepted the UK government’s argument that these conditions were only ‘mistreatment’, not 
‘torture’ (Babar Ahmad and Others v the United Kingdom, 2012). This pronouncement was 
made on the basis of a theoretical assessment, rather than empirical knowledge, since the US 
had refused to allow international inspectors to assess its ‘supermax’ prisons. The United 
Nations Special Rapporteur on torture, Juan Méndez, was still protesting about this in 2015. 
Not until 2014, two years after Ahmad’s European Court of Human Rights appeal, was Juan 
Méndez permitted to visit the Pelican Bay State Prison in California, which holds detainees in 
indefinite solitary confinement – and even then granted entry only in the capacity of an 
‘expert’, not in his role as UN Special Rapporteur (Cageprisoner, 2016). He has firmly stated 
that, ‘The practice of prolonged or indefinite solitary confinement inflicts pain and suffering 
of a psychological nature, which is strictly prohibited by the Convention Against Torture’ 
(United Nations Human Rights: Office of the High Commissioner, 2015). 
 
The practice of hooding detainees has been unlawful in the UK since 1972, since it was 
banned by PM Edward Heath after public outrage at torture of detainees in Northern Ireland. 
This illegality was reconfirmed in a high court judgement in 2011, following revelations, 
after the killing of Baha Moussa in Iraq, over British military regulations unlawfully allowing 
the practice (Cobain and Bowcott, 2011). In blatant contravention of this ban, British police 
   
 
did precisely what was prohibited when Babar Ahmad was taken to the plane for extradition 
in 2012. One of the officers apologised to him, saying that it had been ordered by the US 
military. Ahmad recounted to the Guardian, after his release, that as the police officer 
approached him with blackened goggles and earmuffs, ‘“I told him that, under UK law, it was 
illegal to hood prisoners in this way. But he just said: ‘They want us to put these on you 
before they take custody of you.’” Ahmad justifiably observed, ‘this was how the special 
relationship worked … those Metropolitan police officers looked really worried and scared, 
but they refused to disobey the Americans’ (Verkaik, 2016). 
 
Before boarding the military plane, Ahmad was strip-searched by the Americans, then made 
to dress in a coloured jumpsuit. He was shackled and handcuffed with a chain around his 
waist passed through the cuffs forcing him to walk bent over, with the earmuffs and goggles 
again in place. He thought he was bound for Guantánamo. 
 
On arrival in the US, he was again strip-searched, before six officers, shackled again and left 
for three days in a holding cell with a concrete bed and walls covered in faeces. With the 
temperature held at -14C, he was given a small, thin blanket, not big enough to cover him. He 
recalls: ‘I spent the next three days curled up like a foetus ..., gratefully eating what little food 
they gave me with my bare hands. And all the time prison officers were shouting: ‘He tried to 
blow us all up and he tried to kill Americans’ (Verkaik, 2016). These are the conditions that 
were supposedly just ‘mistreatment’ and not torture, according to British government lawyers 
and the European Court of Human Rights. That’s without considering the following two 
years of solitary confinement, locked in for 23 hours a day, not knowing whether it would be 
for a lifetime. ‘For two years I didn’t see the sun and whenever I left my cell I was strip-
searched and then placed in shackles and handcuffs,’ he later said (Verkaik, 2016). ‘During 
   
 
the supermax prison in America, for two years I lived through complete hell. Those two years 
were the darkest days of my life ... I saw one suicide attempt a week, three suicide attempts in 
one day’ (CAGE, 2016). In order to avoid extreme sleep deprivation, Ahmad had to spend 
fifteen minutes before bedtime every night for two years, carefully air-locking the space 
under his door with his six socks manoeuvred by plastic fork, and positioning an empty 
plastic shampoo bottle in the flow from the air conditioning vent, in order to create white 
noise to block out the sound of screaming all night (United States of America vs Babar 
Ahmad, 2014). 
 
This could indeed have been for his remaining lifetime instead of two years, but for a 
fortunate discovery that Babar Ahmad himself made, while studying in preparation for his 
trial. On one crucial point of detail, his prosecutors had misled the grand jury that had 
indicted him, as indeed had special agent Craig Bowling, of the Department of Homeland 
Security, misled the British officials in preparing documentation for Ahmad’s extradition 
warrant. This experienced computer investigative expert had testified, erroneously, that the 
one US-based server belonging to azzam.com’s ISP firm OSM was based in Trumbull, 
Connecticut. British police documents showed that it was in fact based in Chicago. The 
Connecticut connection was the only thing that gave jurisdiction to the court which indicted 
Ahmad, in the state where he was to be tried (Verkaik, 2016; US District Court, Connecticut, 
2004). 
 
His lawyer, Kelly Barrett, immediately saw the significance, and informed the prosecution 
lawyers that she would move for the case to be withdrawn, since the grand jury had been 
misled and there was no legal basis for it to be tried in Connecticut. Desperate to save face 
and secure a conviction, the prosecutors offered a plea bargain: Ahmad was to plead guilty to 
   
 
material support for terrorism via the website, and the other three charges would be dropped. 
With time served, he could be home in months (Verkaik, 2016). Faced with a similar choice 
to David Hicks (Hicks, 2010; Poynting, 2015), the possibility of his remaining lifetime in 
solitary confinement under abusive conditions as against a plea deal and imminent release 
and repatriation, Babar Ahmad put his hand up. 
 
Asim Qureshi, the research director of CAGE, sums it up succinctly: 
The plea bargain system combined with documented torture of prisoners 
reinforces the narrative of the War on Terror; individuals are forced to admit guilt 
as a way of getting out of horrific conditions, even if the accusations aren’t true or 
are exaggerated. The public is served a story of ‘convicted terrorists’ when in fact 
this label deserves far more scrutiny under a more equitable and open justice 
system (CAGE, 2016). 
 
To conclude: in this case study, we have seen how the professing of radical political and 
religious beliefs, a human right under the ICCPR, becomes criminalised in the contemporary 
case of political Islam. It is somewhat like branding liberation theology as terrorism – and of 
course various Latin American dictatorships did precisely that, and we have little trouble 
seeing their ‘counter-terrorism’ against its proponents as state crime. It is also rather like 
volunteering for the International Brigades in Spain in the 1930s, or sending them money, 
becoming a serious crime punishable by a life sentence. Then, as with the fascists and the 
Argentinian generals, torture or perhaps merely ‘mistreatment’, is deemed acceptable for 
those subversives bereft of their humanity. 
 
Both Judge Janet Hall, and Babar Ahmad himself, agreed that he had been naive in his 
support for the Taliban. Even confronted with the untruth at the basis of Ahmad’s trial, the 
prosecutors asked for a vindictive and disproportionate 25-year prison sentence for his 
   
 
naivete. In sentencing him to just half of that – little more than time served – Judge Hall 
described him as a ‘good person who does not and will not in the future seek to harm other 
people’, and who was not ‘interested in what is commonly known as terrorism’ (United 
States of America vs Babar Ahmad, 2014). 
 
Mr Ahmad is entitled to be a radical. Those formal rights are not allowed in practice to 
Muslim minorities by the western alliance in the ‘war on terror’.  The case of Babar Ahmad is 
an outstanding one in the length of his imprisonment without trial in the UK. Yet it is not the 
‘worst of the worst’ in terms of state crime in the pursuit of counter-terrorism: it is instructive 
in its banality. British police officers apologise in their acts of breaking the law; a US judge, 
wrongfully hearing a case in Connecticut, is apologetic for the disproportionality and the 
misrepresentation of her government’s case, in her upholding of that state’s law, enforced 
transnationally. British members of parliament rhetorically wring their hands but do nothing 
to change the bilaterally unequal extradition law exacted by the Empire. British judges 
express disapproval and remorse at Ahmad’s long imprisonment without trial, but hand him 
over to his fate in the foreign jurisdiction of the United States. European human rights judges, 
in line with the United Nations, express disapproval of long-term (or practically indefinite) 
solitary confinement under abusive conditions, but are collectively comforted by persuading 
themselves that technically it is mere ‘abuse’ and thus falls short of ‘torture’. Admitted 
torturers (on the balance of probabilities in a civil trial) are congratulated in their acquittal 
(beyond reasonable doubt, in a criminal trial) by a British jury, amid the ‘othering’ of the 
‘war on terror’. The torturer’s horse scratches its innocent behind on a tree. Yet the large and 
well supported popular movement in Britain for the defence of Babar’s Ahmad’s human 
rights and for his release, takes nearly twelve years to prevail: but prevail it does. A crucial 
document is unearthed at the eleventh year by the defendant himself, and the quality of mercy 
   
 
makes a late appearance to prevent the whole charade from collapsing into farce in a crisis of 
legitimacy. Humanity is belatedly recognised, and reaffirmed. This is an instructive case in 
both hegemony and counter-hegemony in the ‘war on terror’. Mr Ahmad has regained his 
right to be a radical, but his community has been shown – as indeed have all of us – just   
how circumscribed is that right. 
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1 It is true that Abu Qatada was detained for a somewhat longer amount of time, in total, before he was 
extradited to Jordan in 2013, where in fact he was eventually acquitted of terrorism charges. This incarceration 
was not continuous, however, since Abu Qatada was released, as mandated by courts, albeit for brief periods 
and under control orders.  
2 Though this article only has space to deal with ‘the Ahmad case’, we should at least note  here the case of his 
co‐defendant in the US trial, and co‐appellant to the European Court of Human Rights, against extradition to 
the US: that of British poet Syed Talha Ahsan. His treatment, and in particular the threatened virtually 
indefinite solitary confinement, is made even more egregious by the fact of his suffering from Asperger 
syndrome. Much more was made of the injustice of such circumstances in the public advocacy over the far 
higher profile case of (white) British citizen, Gary McKinnon. 
